The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Publications

The School of Law

January 2012

Excerpts from Chief Justice Roberts' Opinion in
NFIB v. Sebelius
Wilson Huhn
University of Akron School of Law, whuhn@uakron.edu

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/ua_law_publications
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons
Recommended Citation
Huhn, Wilson, "Excerpts from Chief Justice Roberts' Opinion in NFIB v. Sebelius" (2012). Akron Law Publications.
91.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/ua_law_publications/91

This is brought to you for free and open access by The School of Law at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the institutional
repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in Akron Law
Publications by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please contact
mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

Excerpts from Chief Justice Roberts’ Opinion in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012)
Prepared by Wilson Huhn
Introduction to the Opinion
2. [Placing the debate over national universal health care coverage in a broader context.]
In our federal system, the National Government possesses only limited powers; the States
and the people retain the remainder. Nearly two centuries ago, Chief Justice Marshall observed
that “the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted” to the Federal
Government “is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, as long as our system
shall exist.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405 (1819). In this case we must again
determine whether the Constitution grants Congress powers it now asserts, but which many
States and individuals believe it does not possess. Resolving this controversy requires us to
examine both the limits of the Government’s power, and our own limited role in policing those
boundaries.
5. [Describing the broad power of Congress to tax and spend.]
Put simply, Congress may tax and spend. This grant gives the Federal Government
considerable influence even in areas where it cannot directly regulate. The Federal Government
may enact a tax on an activity that it cannot authorize, forbid, or otherwise control.
6. [Expressing the principle that the Court’s powers are limited.]
Members of this Court are vested with the authority to interpret the law; we possess
neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make policy judgments. Those decisions are entrusted
to our Nation’s elected leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people disagree with them.
It is not our job to protect the people from the consequences of their political choices.

Part II (ruling that the Anti-Injunction Act does not apply)
11-12. [Explaining that if the individual mandate constitutes a “tax” within the meaning of
the Anti-Injunction Act, this lawsuit would have to be postponed until the year 2014.]
Before turning to the merits, we need to be sure we have the authority to do so. The AntiInjunction Act provides that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any
tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against
whom such tax was assessed.” 26 U. S. C. §7421(a). This statute protects the Government’s ability to
collect a consistent stream of revenue, by barring litigation to enjoin or otherwise obstruct the
collection of taxes. Because of the Anti-Injunction Act, taxes can ordinarily be challenged only after
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they are paid, by suing for a refund. See Enochs v. Williams Packing & Nav. Co., 370 U. S. 1, 7–8
(1962).
The penalty for not complying with the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate first becomes
enforceable in 2014. The present challenge to the mandate thus seeks to restrain the penalty’s future
collection. Amicus [appointed counsel] contends that the Internal Revenue Code treats the penalty as a
tax, and that the Anti-Injunction Act therefore bars this suit.

12. [Rebutting the argument of appointed counsel that the enforcement mechanism for the
individual mandate is a “tax” for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.]
Amicus contends that the Internal Revenue Code treats the penalty as a tax, and that the
Anti-Injunction Act therefore bars this suit.
The text of the pertinent statutes suggests otherwise. The Anti-Injunction Act applies to
suits “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” §7421(a) (emphasis
added). Congress, however, chose to describe the “[s]hared responsibility payment” imposed on
those who forgo health insurance not as a “tax,” but as a “penalty.” §§5000A(b), (g)(2). There is
no immediate reason to think that a statute applying to “any tax” would apply to a “penalty.”
Congress’s decision to label this exaction a “penalty” rather than a “tax” is significant
because the Affordable Care Act describes many other exactions it creates as “taxes.”
[However] … Congress cannot change whether an exaction is a tax or a penalty for
constitutional purposes simply by describing it as one or the other.
13. [In the interpretation of the interaction between the Affordable Care Act and the AntiInjunction Act, the text of the law is the “best evidence” of Congress’ intent.]
The Anti-Injunction Act and the Affordable Care Act, however, are creatures of Congress’s own
creation. How they relate to each other is up to Congress, and the best evidence of Congress’s
intent is the statutory text.

Part III-A (ruling that the individual mandate is not constitutional
under the Commerce Clause
18. [textual argument against the individual mandate as an exercise of the Commerce
Power]
The Constitution grants Congress the power to “regulate Commerce.” Art. I, §8, cl. 3 (emphasis
added). The power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be
regulated. If the power to “regulate” something included the power to create it, many of the provisions in
the Constitution would be superfluous. For example, the Constitution gives Congress the power to “coin
Money,” in addition to the power to “regulate the Value thereof.” Id., cl. 5. And it gives Congress the
power to “raise and support Armies” and to “provide and maintain a Navy,” in addition to the power to
“make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” Id., cls. 12–14. If the
power to regulate the armed forces or the value of money included the power to bring the subject of the
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regulation into existence, the specific grant of such powers would have been unnecessary. The language
of the Constitution reflects the natural understanding that the power to regulate assumes there is already
something to be regulated.
19-20. [Longstanding precedent speaks of Congress’ power to regulate “economic activity”]
Our precedent also reflects this understanding. As expansive as our cases construing the scope of the
commerce power have been, they all have one thing in common: They uniformly describe the power as
reaching “activity.” It is nearly impossible to avoid the word when quoting them. See, e.g., Lopez, supra,
at 560 (“Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that
activity will be sustained”); Perez, 402 U. S., at 154 (“Where the class of activities is regulated and that
class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power to excise, as trivial, individual
instances of the class” (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted)); Wickard, supra, at 125
(“[E]ven if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still,
whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce”); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 37 (1937) (“Although activities may be
intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens
and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control”).

20-21. [Finding that the individual mandate does not regulate commercial activity but
rather requires individuals to engage in economic activity, and finding that upholding this
law would greatly expand the power of Congress.]
The individual mandate, however, does not regulate existing commercial activity. It instead
compels individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product, on the ground that their
failure to do so affects interstate commerce. Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to
regulate individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially vast domain to congressional authority. Every day individuals do not do an infinite number of things. In some
cases they decide not to do something; in others they simply fail to do it. Allowing Congress to justify
federal regulation by pointing to the effect of inaction on commerce would bring countless decisions an
individual could potentially make within the scope of federal regulation, and—under the Government’s
theory—empower Congress to make those decisions for him.
23-24. [Continuing the policy argument against allowing Congress the power to require individuals
to engage in economic activity.]
People, for reasons of their own, often fail to do things that would be good for them or good for
society. Those failures—joined with the similar failures of others—can readily have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce. Under the Government’s logic, that authorizes Congress to use its commerce
power to compel citizens to act as the Government would have them act.
That is not the country the Framers of our Constitution envisioned. … Accepting the
Government’s theory would give Congress the same license to regulate what we do not do, fundamentally
changing the relation between the citizen and the Federal government.
24. [Intent and tradition arguments against the constitutionality of the individual mandate under
the Commerce Clause.]
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To an economist, perhaps, there is no difference between activity and inactivity; both have
measurable economic effects on commerce. But the distinction between doing something and doing
nothing would not have been lost on the Framers, who were “practical statesmen,” not metaphysical
philosophers. Industrial Union Dept., AFL–CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S. 607, 673
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment). As we have explained, “the framers of the Constitution
were not mere visionaries, toying with speculations or theories, but practical men, dealing with the facts
of political life as they understood them, putting into form the government they were creating, and
prescribing in language clear and intelligible the powers that government was to take.” South Carolina v.
United States, 199 U. S. 437, 449 (1905). The Framers gave Congress the power to regulate commerce,
not to compel it, and for over 200 years both our decisions and Congress’s actions have reflected this understanding. There is no reason to depart from that understanding now.

26. [Finding that the individual mandate regulates individuals, not economic activity.]
Everyone will likely participate in the markets for food, clothing, transportation, shelter, or
energy; that does not authorize Congress to direct them to purchase particular products in those or other
markets today. The Commerce Clause is not a general license to regulate an individual from cradle to
grave, simply because he will predictably engage in particular transactions. Any police power to regulate
individuals as such, as opposed to their activities, remains vested in the States.
28-29. [Ruling that the individual mandate is not constitutional under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.]
As our jurisprudence under the Necessary and Proper Clause has developed, we have been very
deferential to Congress’s determination that a regulation is “necessary.” We have thus upheld laws that
are “‘convenient, or useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’” Comstock, 560 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 5) (quoting McCulloch, supra, at 413, 418). But we have also carried out our
responsibility to declare unconstitutional those laws that undermine the structure of government
established by the Constitution. Such laws, which are not “consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the
constitution,” McCulloch, supra, at 421, are not “proper [means] for carrying into Execution” Congress’s
enumerated powers. Rather, they are, “in the words of The Federalist, ‘merely acts of usurpation’ which
‘deserve to be treated as such.’” Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, 924 (1997) (alterations omitted)
(quoting The Federalist No. 33, at 204 (A. Hamilton)); see also New York, 505 U. S., at 177; Comstock,
supra, at ___ (slip op., at 5) (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment) (“It is of fundamental importance to
consider whether essential attributes of state sovereignty are compromised by the assertion of federal
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause . . .”).
Applying these principles, the individual mandate cannot be sustained under the Necessary and
Proper Clause as an essential component of the insurance reforms. Each of our prior cases upholding laws
under that Clause involved exercises of authority derivative of, and in service to, a granted power. For
example, we have upheld provisions permitting continued confinement of those already in federal
custody when they could not be safely released, Comstock, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 1–2); criminalizing
bribes involving organizations receiving federal funds, Sabri v. United States, 541 U. S. 600, 602, 605
(2004); and tolling state statutes of limitations while cases are pending in federal court, Jinks v. Richland
County, 538 U. S. 456, 459, 462 (2003). The individual mandate, by contrast, vests Congress with the
extraordinary ability to create the necessary predicate to the exercise of an enumerated power.
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30. [Conclusion regarding the constitutionality of the individual mandate under the
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Just as the individual mandate cannot be sustained as a law regulating the substantial effects of
the failure to purchase health insurance, neither can it be upheld as a “necessary and proper” component
of the insurance reforms. The commerce power thus does not authorize the mandate. Accord, post, at 4–
16 (joint opinion of SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., dissenting).

Part III-B (framing the issue
under the General Welfare Clause)
31. [Explaining that the courts have the duty to construe a statute so as to be constitutional,
if that is “fairly possible.”]
The text of a statute can sometimes have more than one possible meaning. To take a
familiar example, a law that reads “no vehicles in the park” might, or might not, ban bicycles in
the park. And it is well established that if a statute has two possible meanings, one of which
violates the Constitution, courts should adopt the meaning that does not do so. Justice Story said
that 180 years ago: “No court ought, unless the terms of an act rendered it unavoidable, to give a
construction to it which should involve a violation, however unintentional, of the constitution.”
Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 448–449 (1830). Justice Holmes made the same point a century
later: “[T]he rule is settled that as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of
which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which
will save the Act.” Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 148 (1927) (concurring opinion).
The most straightforward reading of the mandate is that it commands individuals to
purchase insurance. [But this “command” is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.] …
Under our precedent, it is therefore necessary to ask whether the Government’s alternative
reading of the statute—that it only imposes a tax on those without insurance—is a reasonable
one.
Under the mandate, if an individual does not maintain health insurance, the only
consequence is that he must make an additional payment to the IRS when he pays his taxes. See
§5000A(b). That, according to the Government, means the mandate can be regarded as
establishing a condition—not owning health insurance—that triggers a tax—the required
payment to the IRS. Under that theory, the mandate is not a legal command to buy insurance.
Rather, it makes going without insurance just another thing the Government taxes, like buying
gasoline or earning income. And if the mandate is in effect just a tax hike on certain taxpayers
who do not have health insurance, it may be within Congress’s constitutional power to tax.
The question is not whether that is the most natural interpretation of the mandate, but
only whether it is a “fairly possible” one. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932). As we
have explained, “every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute
from unconstitutionality.” Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 657 (1895). The Government
asks us to interpret the mandate as imposing a tax, if it would otherwise violate the Constitution.
5

Granting the Act the full measure of deference owed to federal statutes, it can be so read, for the
reasons set forth below.

Part III-C (upholding the individual mandate
under the General Welfare Clause)
33. [Explaining why the enforcement mechanism for the individual mandate “looks like a
tax,” and stating that the label attached to the provision is not determinative.]
The exaction the Affordable Care Act imposes on those without health insurance looks
like a tax in many respects. The “[s]hared responsibility payment,” as the statute entitles it, is
paid into the Treasury by “taxpayer[s]” when they file their tax returns. 26 U. S. C. §5000A(b). It
does not apply to individuals who do not pay federal income taxes because their household
income is less than the filing threshold in the Internal Revenue Code. §5000A(e)(2). For
taxpayers who do owe the payment, its amount is determined by such familiar factors as taxable
income, number of dependents, and joint filing status. §§5000A(b)(3), (c)(2), (c)(4). The
requirement to pay is found in the Internal Revenue Code and enforced by the IRS, which—as
we previously explained—must assess and collect it “in the same manner as taxes.” Supra, at
13–14. This process yields the essential feature of any tax: it produces at least some revenue for
the Government. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22, 28, n. 4 (1953). Indeed, the payment is
expected to raise about $4 billion per year by 2017. Congressional Budget Office, Payments of
Penalties for Being Uninsured Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Apr. 30,
2010), in Selected CBO Publications Related to Health Care Legislation,2009–2010, p. 71 (rev.
2010). It is of course true that the Act describes the payment as a “penalty,” not a “tax.” But
while that label is fatal to the application of the Anti-Injunction Act, supra, at 12–13, it does not
determine whether the payment may be viewed as an exercise of Congress’s taxing power. It is
up to Congress whether to apply the Anti-Injunction Act to any particular statute, so it makes
sense to be guided by Congress’s choice of label on that question. That choice does not,
however, control whether an exaction is within Congress’s constitutional power to tax.
35-36. [Describing the “functional approach” used in prior cases to determine whether a
statute constitutes a “tax” or a “penalty,” and explaining why the enforcement mechanism
of the individual mandate functions as a tax.]
Our cases confirm this functional approach. For example, in Drexel Furniture, we
focused on three practical characteristics of the so-called tax on employing child laborers that
convinced us the “tax” was actually a penalty. First, the tax imposed an exceedingly heavy burden—10 percent of a company’s net income—on those who employed children, no matter how
small their infraction. Second, it imposed that exaction only on those who knowingly employed
underage laborers. Such scienter requirements are typical of punitive statutes, because Congress
often wishes to punish only those who intentionally break the law. Third, this “tax” was enforced
in part by the Department of Labor, an agency responsible for punishing violations of labor laws,
not collecting revenue. 259 U. S., at 36–37; see also, e.g., Kurth Ranch, 511 U. S., at 780–782
(considering, inter alia, the amount of the exaction, and the fact that it was imposed for violation
of a separate criminal law); Constantine, supra, at 295 (same).
6

The same analysis here suggests that the shared responsibility payment may for
constitutional purposes be considered a tax, not a penalty: First, for most Americans the amount
due will be far less than the price of insurance, and, by statute, it can never be more. It may often
be a reasonable financial decision to make the payment rather than purchase insurance, unlike
the “prohibitory” financial punishment in Drexel Furniture. 259 U. S., at 37. Second, the
individual mandate contains no scienter requirement. Third, the payment is collected solely by
the IRS through the normal means of taxation—except that the Service is not allowed to use
those means most suggestive of a punitive sanction, such as criminal prosecution. See
§5000A(g)(2). The reasons the Court in Drexel Furniture held that what was called a “tax” there
was a penalty support the conclusion that what is called a “penalty” here may be viewed as a tax.
36-37. [Rebutting the argument that this is a “penalty” rather than a “tax” because it seeks
to influence conduct.]
But taxes that seek to influence conduct are nothing new. Some of our earliest federal
taxes sought to deter the purchase of imported manufactured goods in order to foster the growth
of domestic industry. See W. Brownlee, Federal Taxation in America 22 (2d ed. 2004); cf. 2 J.
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §962, p. 434 (1833) (“the taxing
power is often, very often, applied for other purposes, than revenue”). Today, federal and state
taxes can compose more than half the retail price of cigarettes not just to raise more money, but
to encourage people to quit smoking. And we have upheld such obviously regulatory measures
as taxes on selling marijuana and sawed-off shotguns. See United States v. Sanchez, 340 U. S.
42, 44– 45 (1950); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U. S. 506, 513 (1937). Indeed, “[e]very tax is
in some measure regulatory. To some extent it interposes an economic impediment to the activity
taxed as compared with others not taxed.” Sonzinsky, supra, at 513. That §5000A seeks to shape
decisions about whether to buy health insurance does not mean that it cannot be a valid exercise
of the taxing power.
37-38. [Arguing that the individual mandate is not a penalty for violating the law but
simply a tax.]
While the individual mandate clearly aims to induce the purchase of health insurance, it
need not be read to declare that failing to do so is unlawful. Neither the Act nor any other law
attaches negative legal consequences to not buying health insurance, beyond requiring a payment
to the IRS. The Government agrees with that reading, confirming that if someone chooses to pay
rather than obtain health insurance, they have fully complied with the law. Brief for United
States 60–61; Tr. of Oral Arg. 49–50 (Mar. 26, 2012).
Indeed, it is estimated that four million people each year will choose to pay the IRS rather
than buy insurance. See Congressional Budget Office, supra, at 71. We would expect Congress
to be troubled by that prospect if such conduct were unlawful. That Congress apparently regards
such extensive failure to comply with the mandate as tolerable suggests that Congress did not
think it was creating four million outlaws. It suggests instead that the shared responsibility
payment merely imposes a tax citizens may lawfully choose to pay in lieu of buying health
insurance.
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39. [Rejecting the argument that the “label” that Congress placed upon the law calling the
enforcement mechanism for the individual mandate a “penalty” instead of a “tax” is
controlling for constitutional purposes, and rebutting the dissent’s argument that the
Court is “rewriting” the legislation.]
The joint dissenters argue that we cannot uphold §5000A as a tax because Congress did
not “frame” it as such. Post, at 17. In effect, they contend that even if the Constitution permits
Congress to do exactly what we interpret this statute to do, the law must be struck down because
Congress used the wrong labels. An example may help illustrate why labels should not control
here. Suppose Congress enacted a statute providing that every taxpayer who owns a house
without energy efficient windows must pay $50 to the IRS. The amount due is adjusted based on
factors such as taxable income and joint filing status, and is paid along with the taxpayer’s
income tax return. Those whose income is below the filing threshold need not pay. The required
payment is not called a “tax,” a “penalty,” or anything else. No one would doubt that this law
imposed a tax, and was within Congress’s power to tax. That conclusion should not change
simply because Congress used the word “penalty” to describe the payment. Interpreting such a
law to be a tax would hardly “[i]mpos[e] a tax through judicial legislation.” Post, at 25. Rather, it
would give practical effect to the Legislature’s enactment.
41. [Rejecting the argument that the individual mandate imposes a “direct tax” in violation
of the Constitution’s requirement that direct taxes be apportioned among the states.]
A tax on going without health insurance does not fall within any recognized category of
direct tax. It is not a capitation. Capitations are taxes paid by every person, “without regard to
property, profession, or any other circumstance.” Hylton, supra, at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.)
(emphasis altered). The whole point of the shared responsibility payment is that it is triggered by
specific circumstances—earning a certain amount of income but not obtaining health insurance.
The payment is also plainly not a tax on the ownership of land or personal property. The shared
responsibility payment is thus not a direct tax that must be apportioned among the several States.
43-44. [Explaining why the power to tax is narrower than the power to regulate, and why
this law is a “tax” and not a “penalty.”]
… [A]lthough the breadth of Congress’s power to tax is greater than its power to regulate
commerce, the taxing power does not give Congress the same degree of control over individual
behavior. Once we recognize that Congress may regulate a particular decision under the Commerce Clause, the Federal Government can bring its full weight to bear. Congress may simply
command individuals to do as it directs. An individual who disobeys may be subjected to
criminal sanctions. Those sanctions can include not only fines and imprisonment, but all the attendant consequences of being branded a criminal: deprivation of otherwise protected civil
rights, such as the right to bear arms or vote in elections; loss of employment opportunities;
social stigma; and severe disabilities in other controversies, such as custody or immigration
disputes.
By contrast, Congress’s authority under the taxing power is limited to requiring an
individual to pay money into the Federal Treasury, no more. If a tax is properly paid, the
8

Government has no power to compel or punish individuals subject to it. We do not make light of
the severe burden that taxation—especially taxation motivated by a regulatory purpose—can
impose. But imposition of a tax nonetheless leaves an individual with a lawful choice to do or
not do a certain act, so long as he is willing to pay a tax levied on that choice.

Part III-D (stating the conclusion upholding
the constitutionality of the individual mandate
44-45. [Chief Justice Roberts’ conclusion regarding the individual mandate.]
The Federal Government does not have the power to order people to buy health
insurance. Section 5000A would therefore be unconstitutional if read as a command. The Federal
Government does have the power to impose a tax on those without health insurance. Section
5000A is therefore constitutional, because it can reasonably be read as a tax.

Part IV (upholding the expansion of the Medicaid program but striking
down the power of the federal government to withhold funding for the
existing Medicaid program for any State that refuses to participate in the
Medicaid expansion)
46-47. [Describing Congress’ power under the General Welfare Clause and the limits upon
that power to coerce the States.]
The Spending Clause grants Congress the power “to pay the Debts and provide for the . .
. general Welfare of the United States.” U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 1. We have long recognized
that Congress may use this power to grant federal funds to the States, and may condition such a
grant upon the States’ “taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to take.”
College Savings Bank, 527 U. S., at 686. Such measures “encourage a State to regulate in a
particular way, [and] influenc[e] a State’s policy choices.” New York, supra, at 166. The conditions imposed by Congress ensure that the funds are used by the States to “provide for the . . .
general Welfare” in the manner Congress intended.
At the same time, our cases have recognized limits on Congress’s power under the
Spending Clause to secure state compliance with federal objectives. “We have repeatedly
characterized . . . Spending Clause legislation as ‘much in the nature of a contract.’” Barnes v.
Gorman, 536 U. S. 181, 186 (2002) (quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,
451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981)). The legitimacy of Congress’s exercise of the spending power “thus rests
on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’” Pennhurst,
supra, at 17. Respecting this limitation is critical to ensuring that Spending Clause legislation
does not undermine the status of the States as independent sovereigns in our federal system. That
system “rests on what might at first seem a counterintuitive insight, that ‘freedom is enhanced by
the creation of two governments, not one.’ ” Bond, 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (quoting
Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 758 (1999)). For this reason, “the Constitution has never been
understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Con9

gress’ instructions.” New York, supra, at 162. Otherwise the two-government system established
by the Framers would give way to a system that vests power in one central government, and
individual liberty would suffer.
That insight has led this Court to strike down federal legislation that commandeers a
State’s legislative or administrative apparatus for federal purposes. … Congress may use its
spending power to create incentives for States to act in accordance with federal policies. But
when “pressure turns into compulsion,” ibid., the legislation runs contrary to our system of
federalism.
48. [Stating the principle that the federal government may not “force the states to
implement a federal program.”]
Permitting the Federal Government to force the States to implement a federal program
would threaten the political accountability key to our federal system.
49. [Stating that, on the other hand, if the States wish to operate as “separate and
independent sovereigns,” then “they have to act like it.”]
As our decision in Steward Machine confirms, Congress may attach appropriate
conditions to federal taxing and spending programs to preserve its control over the use of federal
funds. In the typical case we look to the States to defend their prerogatives by adopting “the
simple expedient of not yielding” to federal blandishments when they do not want to embrace the
federal policies as their own. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 482 (1923). The States are
separate and independent sovereigns. Sometimes they have to act like it.
50. [Articulating the general standard used to determine whether or not a conditional
spending program is coercive against the States.]
We have upheld Congress’s authority to condition the receipt of funds on the States’
complying with restrictions on the use of those funds, because that is the means by which
Congress ensures that the funds are spent according to its view of the “general Welfare.”
Conditions that do not here govern the use of the funds, however, cannot be justified on that
basis. When, for example, such conditions take the form of threats to terminate other significant
independent grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States to
accept policy changes.
52-53 [Contending that the Medicaid expansion contained in the ACA is a separate and
different program than existing Medicaid.]
JUSTICE GINSBURG claims that Dole is distinguishable because here “Congress has
not threatened to withhold funds earmarked for any other program.” Post, at 47. But that begs the
question: The States contend that the expansion is in reality a new program and that Congress is
forcing them to accept it by threatening the funds for the existing Medicaid program. We cannot
agree that existing Medicaid and the expansion dictated by the Affordable Care Act are all one
program simply because “Congress styled” them as such. Post, at 49. If the expansion is not
10

properly viewed as a modification of the existing Medicaid program, Congress’s decision to so
title it is irrelevant.
Here, the Government claims that the Medicaid expansion is properly viewed merely as a
modification of the existing program because the States agreed that Congress could change the
terms of Medicaid when they signed on in the first place. The Government observes that the
Social Security Act, which includes the original Medicaid provisions, contains a clause expressly
reserving “[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision” of that statute. 42 U. S. C. §1304.
So it does. But “if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must
do so unambiguously.” Pennhurst, 451 U. S., at 17. A State confronted with statutory language
reserving the right to “alter” or “amend” the pertinent provisions of the Social Security Act
might reasonably assume that Congress was entitled to make adjustments to the Medicaid
program as it developed. Congress has in fact done so, sometimes conditioning only the new
funding, other times both old and new. See, e.g., Social Security Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat.
1381–1382, 1465 (extending Medicaid eligibility, but partly conditioning only the new funding);
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, §4601, 104 Stat. 1388–166 (extending eligibility,
and conditioning old and new funds).
The Medicaid expansion, however, accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely degree. The
original program was designed to cover medical services for four particular categories of the
needy: the disabled, the blind, the elderly, and needy families with dependent children. See 42 U.
S. C. §1396a(a)(10). Previous amendments to Medicaid eligibility merely altered and expanded
the boundaries of these categories. Under the Affordable Care Act, Medicaid is transformed into
a program to meet the health care needs of the entire nonelderly population with income below
133 percent of the poverty level. It is no longer a program to care for the neediest among us, but
rather an element of a comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance
coverage.
Indeed, the manner in which the expansion is structured indicates that while Congress
may have styled the expansion a mere alteration of existing Medicaid, it recognized it was
enlisting the States in a new health care program. Congress created a separate funding provision
to cover the costs of providing services to any person made newly eligible by the expansion.
While Congress pays 50 to 83 percent of the costs of covering individuals currently enrolled in
Medicaid, §1396d(b), once the expansion is fully implemented Congress will pay 90 percent of
the costs for newly eligible persons, §1396d(y)(1). The conditions on use of the different funds
are also distinct. Congress mandated that newly eligible persons receive a level of coverage that
is less comprehensive than the traditional Medicaid benefit package.
55. [Ruling on the constitutionality of Medicaid expansion and the right of the federal
government to withhold new funding from States that choose not to participate in the new
program.]
Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds under the Affordable
Care Act to expand the availability of health care, and requiring that States accepting such funds
comply with the conditions on their use. What Congress is not free to do is to penalize States that
choose not to participate in that new program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding.
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56. [Ruling on constitutionality of Medicaid expansion, continued.]
Today’s holding does not affect the continued application of §1396c to the existing
Medicaid program. Nor does it affect the Secretary’s ability to withdraw funds provided under
the Affordable Care Act if a State that has chosen to participate in the expansion fails to comply
with the requirements of that Act.
57-58. [Ruling on “severability” upholding the remainder of the ACA.]
We are confident that Congress would have wanted to preserve the rest of the Act. It is
fair to say that Congress assumed that every State would participate in the Medicaid expansion,
given that States had no real choice but to do so. The States contend that Congress enacted the
rest of the Act with such full participation in mind; they point out that Congress made Medicaid
a means for satisfying the mandate, 26 U. S. C. §5000A(f)(1)(A)(ii), and enacted no other plan
for providing coverage to many low-income individuals. According to the States, this means that
the entire Act must fall.
We disagree. The Court today limits the financial pressure the Secretary may apply to
induce States to accept the terms of the Medicaid expansion. As a practical matter, that means
States may now choose to reject the expansion; that is the whole point. But that does not mean
all or even any will. Some States may indeed decline to participate, either because they are
unsure they will be able to afford their share of the new funding obligations, or because they are
unwilling to commit the administrative resources necessary to support the expansion. Other
States, however, may voluntarily sign up, finding the idea of expanding Medicaid coverage
attractive, particularly given the level of federal funding the Act offers at the outset.
We have no way of knowing how many States will accept the terms of the expansion, but
we do not believe Congress would have wanted the whole Act to fall, simply because some may
choose not to participate. The other reforms Congress enacted, after all, will remain “fully
operative as a law,” Champlin, supra, at 234, and will still function in a way “consistent with
Congress’ basic objectives in enacting the statute,” Booker, supra, at 259. Confident that
Congress would not have intended anything different, we conclude that the rest of the Act need
not fall in light of our constitutional holding.
58-59 [Conclusion]
The Affordable Care Act is constitutional in part and unconstitutional in part. The
individual mandate cannot be upheld as an exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause. That Clause authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce, not to order
individuals to engage in it. In this case, however, it is reasonable to construe what Congress has
done as increasing taxes on those who have a certain amount of income, but choose to go without
health insurance. Such legislation is within Congress’s power to tax. As for the Medicaid
expansion, that portion of the Affordable Care Act violates the Constitution by threatening
existing Medicaid funding. Congress has no authority to order the States to regulate according to
its instructions. Congress may offer the States grants and require the States to comply with
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accompanying conditions, but the States must have a genuine choice whether to accept the offer.
The States are given no such choice in this case: They must either accept a basic change in the
nature of Medicaid, or risk losing all Medicaid funding. The remedy for that constitutional
violation is to preclude the Federal Government from imposing such a sanction. That remedy
does not require striking down other portions of the Affordable Care Act.
The Framers created a Federal Government of limited powers, and assigned to this Court
the duty of enforcing those limits. The Court does so today. But the Court does not express any
opinion on the wisdom of the Affordable Care Act. Under the Constitution, that judgment is reserved to the people.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
It is so ordered.
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